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Would you test for 5000 Shillings? HIV risk
and willingness to accept HIV testing in Tanzania
Jan Ostermann1,2,3*, Derek S. Brown2,4, Axel Mühlbacher2,5, Bernard Njau6 and Nathan Thielman1,7

Abstract
Objectives: Despite substantial public health efforts to increase HIV testing, testing rates have plateaued in many
countries and rates of repeat testing for those with ongoing risk are low. To inform policies aimed at increasing
uptake of HIV testing, we identified characteristics associated with individuals’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) an HIV
test in a general population sample and among two high-risk populations in Moshi, Tanzania.
Methods: In total, 721 individuals, including randomly selected community members (N = 402), female barworkers
(N = 135), and male Kilimanjaro mountain porters (N = 184), were asked in a double-bounded contingent valuation
format if they would test for HIV in exchange for 2000, 5000 or 10,000 Shillings (approximately $1.30, $3.20, and
$6.40, respectively). The study was conducted between September 2012 and February 2013.
Results: More than one quarter of participants (196; 27 %) stated they would be willing to test for Tanzania Shilling
(TSH) 2000, whereas one in seven (98; 13.6 %) required more than TSH 10,000. The average WTA estimate was TSH
4564 (95 % Confidence Interval: TSH 4201 to 4927). Significant variation in WTA estimates by gender, HIV risk factors
and other characteristics plausibly reflects variation in individuals’ valuations of benefits of and barriers to testing.
WTA estimates were higher among males than females. Among males, WTA was nearly one-third lower for those
who reported symptoms of HIV than those who did not. Among females, WTA estimates varied with respondents’
education, own and partners’ HIV testing history, and lifetime reports of transactional sex. For both genders, the
most significant association was observed with respondents’ perception of the accuracy of the HIV test; those
believing HIV tests to be completely accurate were willing to test for approximately one third less than their
counterparts. The mean WTA estimates identified in this study suggest that within the study population,
incentivized universal HIV testing could potentially identify undiagnosed HIV infections at an incentive cost of $150
per prevalent infection and $1400 per incident infection, with corresponding costs per quality adjusted life year
(QALY) gained of $70 for prevalent and $620 for incident HIV infections.
Conclusions: The results support the value of information about the accuracy of HIV testing, and suggest that
relatively modest amounts of money may be sufficient to incentivize at-risk populations to test.
Keywords: HIV testing; Tanzania; Sub-Saharan Africa; Willingness to accept; Contingent valuation; Incentives

Background
HIV counseling and testing (HCT) is a cost-effective
means of primary and secondary HIV prevention and a
point of entry into HIV care and treatment [1–3]. Despite
substantial public health efforts to increase HIV testing,
particularly in populations with generalized HIV
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epidemics, HIV testing rates have plateaued. In addition,
rates of repeat testing among persons with ongoing risk
are low. For example, in Tanzania, where there is widespread availability of varied HIV testing options, more
than half of men and women ages 15–49 have never
tested, and fewer than one-third reported testing in the
previous 12 months [4]. Testing rates remain low even
among populations at extreme risk: a recent report by the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS described
that across 35 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, only
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60 % of female sex workers had received an HIV test result
in the past 12 months [5].
Basic economic theory states that rational, forwardlooking individuals will test for HIV if the expected
(cumulative) benefits are greater than the expected (cumulative) costs, including disutility and unpleasantness
of the test itself, the discomfort associated with receiving potentially negative information, and the opportunity costs of testing (e.g., transportation costs, lost
household or labor market productivity, etc.) [6]. This
basic framework applies in resource-rich as well as
resource-poor settings such as SSA, where decades of
health promotion, education, and medical advances have
significantly altered the landscape of HIV prevention,
diagnosis and treatment [7].
HIV testing provides several potential benefits: a positive
test result establishes the diagnosis of HIV infection,
which is the first step for accessing effective, lifeprolonging treatment for an otherwise fatal disease,
whereas an HIV-negative test result removes uncertainty
about the individual’s serostatus. However, there may be
offsets to these benefits, such as the expected cost of having to live with the information from a positive test result
(e.g., stress, social isolation, guilt) [8, 9]. Like several other
diagnostic tests with similar benefits, the behavior of a
person who actually tests for HIV reveals an implicit
value of the test (implicit willingness to pay, WTP),
which in some cases corresponds to a substantial
amount of money [10, 11].
However, among populations with limited resources,
particularly among most parts of SSA, the value of HIV
testing to an individual may not exceed the opportunity
costs (e.g., food, housing), and behavioral economics
suggests that individuals may not always act rationally
according to classic economic theory [12, 13]. In the
only WTP study in SSA (conducted among persons who
were not actually testing), half were unwilling to pay any
amount of money for an HIV test [14]. Further, despite
the widespread availability of free HIV testing in SSA,
and significant increases in the number of clients presenting for free vs. fee-based HCT [2], substantial numbers of people do not test. These results suggest that,
consistent with economic theory on other non-financial
costs from testing, financial costs are not the only barrier, and that individuals’ valuations of other costs,
including the time and monetary cost of accessing testing venues, fears of knowing the result, and HIV-related
stigma, outweigh their valuations of the expected benefits of a test [6].
In theory, subsidies in the form of incentives can change
an individual’s cost structure, in that incentives offset financial and non-financial costs and “tip the scale” toward
making HIV testing and repeat testing a utility maximizing
choice in a simple benefit-cost (or more sophisticated
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forward-looking) model [15–17]. Incentives may thus be
used to align individual and social preferences for specific
behaviors [18]. Financial and non-financial incentives have
been used to encourage the use of diverse preventive and
health behaviors [19–23], including to promote HIV risk
reduction [24–29]. However, research on the potential
effectiveness of incentives to encourage HIV testing has
been limited. A recent review [30] identified only 3
studies that evaluated the effect of incentives for HIV
testing – one in the United States [31] and two in subSaharan Africa [32, 33]; incentives were associated with
increased rates of clients completing HCT [31, 33] and
with increased testing uptake among higher-risk populations [32].
Importantly, none of the studies assessed the potential
incentive range required to increase testing, nor did
these studies characterize variation in the balance
between benefits and costs (both direct financial costs
and non-financial barriers to testing) across individuals.
In theory, an incentive only needs to be as large as the
barrier [34], thus, the optimal incentive amount varies
with individuals’ perceived benefits and barriers to testing. To inform policies aimed at increasing uptake of
HIV testing, we analyzed variation in the net value that
individuals place on barriers to testing. Specifically, we
identify characteristics associated with individuals’
willingness-to-accept (WTA) an HIV test in a general
population sample and in two high-risk populations
using a double-bounded contingent valuation format.

Methods
Setting

The study was conducted between September 2012 and
February 2013 in Moshi, Tanzania. In 2012, the town
had a population of 184,292 [35], with an estimated HIV
prevalence of 3.8 % [4]. Public health officials in the
study area identified two populations at particularly high
risk of HIV infection: female barworkers and male
mountain porters. HIV prevalence among barworkers in
this area has been estimated at 19 to 26 % [36, 37]. Kilimanjaro mountain porters [38] are predominantly young
males, face volatile income cycles, and spend extended
time away from home, thus sharing many characteristics
with other high-risk groups, such as long-distance truck
drivers [39, 40], fishermen [41–43], miners [44, 45], and
migrant farm workers [46]. HCT services in the study
area are available, free of charge, at hospitals, health centers, and free-standing voluntary counseling and testing
facilities. Intermittently, mobile and outreach testing
options have also been available at venues such as
schools, markets, or workplaces. For clients who test
HIV positive, 8 HIV care and treatment centers provide
access to antiretroviral therapy [47].
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Sample

The characteristics and HIV testing preferences of 486
randomly selected community residents and two high-risk
populations participating in the HIV Testing Preferences in
Tanzania study (2012–2014) were previously described
[48, 49]. In short, cluster-randomization and Expanded
Programme on Immunization sampling methodology [50]
were used to enroll a random sample of male and female
community members from an urban setting in Northern
Tanzania. Forty mitaa (singular: mtaa, an administrative
area translated as ‘neighborhood’) within Moshi Municipality were randomly selected. Within each mtaa, a randomly selected GPS coordinate was used to identify a
house that served as the starting point for participant
enrollment. In each household, one adult age 18–49 was
randomly selected for an in-person interview in the
respondent’s home. Snowball sampling was subsequently
used to recruit 162 female barworkers and 194 male
mountain porters of the same age range in the same area.
Seed participants were recruited from barworkers presenting for a health check-up at a municipal health center and
from climbing companies and a porters union. Eligible
persons were invited to a research office and verbally consented into the study. Participants who reported to have
never been sexually active (N = 87) and those who reported to have previously tested positive for HIV (N = 34)
were excluded from analyses for this manuscript.
Survey

Surveys were administered by trained interviewers in participants’ native language, Kiswahili, to assess HIV testing
history and plans, preferences for various actual or hypothetical HIV testing options, as well as sociodemographic
and HIV risk characteristics. Protocols for key aspects of
the research implementation and low refusal rates (below
5 %) have been previously described [48].
The survey included dichotomous choice questions
that assessed participants’ willingness to test for HIV in
exchange for a monetary payment. Prior qualitative
work [6] and pre-tests of the WTA questions suggested
a mistrust of payments for HIV testing; therefore, WTA
questions were prefaced with an introductory script:
“You said it takes time to test, and testing may interfere
with your normal activities. If someone asked you to
change your plans for tomorrow in order to test for HIV,
it may be appropriate if they compensate you for your
time.”
Following the introductory script, participants were
asked: “If you were offered 5000 Shilling to test for HIV
tomorrow, would you test?” Those who responded positively were asked “If you were offered 2,000 Shilling to
test for HIV tomorrow, would you test?”; those who
responded negatively to the first question were asked “If
you were offered 10,000 Shilling to test for HIV tomorrow,
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would you test?”. As a result, the dichotomous choice
questions resulted in 4 possible outcomes:
 “Yes” to the offer of 5000 and again “yes” to the offer

of 2000
 “Yes” to the offer of 5000 and “no” to the offer of

2000
 “No” to the offer of 5000 and “yes” to the offer of

10,000
 “No” to the offer of 5000 and again “no” to the offer

of 10,000
Participants who were not willing to test for the highest bid amount were asked a follow-up question: “How
much would they have to offer so that you would test for
HIV tomorrow?” The incentive range was selected based
on focus groups and pretests, in which the salient range
from low to high acceptability among the sample was
identified. At the time of the study 1 US Dollar was
worth approximately 1,550 TSH. The cutoff values of
2,000 TSH, 5,000 TSH and 10,000 TSH corresponded to
approximately $1.30, $3.20, and $6.40, respectively. The
average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at the
time of the study was approximately $835 per year, or
$2.30 per day.
Model

We assume that individuals maximize utility and face a
tradeoff between testing and the level of consumption of
all other goods, subject to resource constraints in terms
of income (unobserved on this survey) and time (an
identical endowment for all individuals). The societal
perspective, promoted by public health officials and clinicians, is that the value of information is unambiguously positive because it may change health-related
behaviors, including linkage to care for those found to
be HIV positive, and improve others’ welfare through
reduced HIV transmission risk. From the individual’s
perspective, however, the private value of information is
ambiguous, depending on preferences, risks, and individual characteristics. Clearly, revealed preferences in the
form of low observed testing rates indicate that for many
persons testing is not utility-maximizing in equilibrium.
The time and travel costs of seeking testing are negative
even if there is generally no financial cost to testing in
our study area. An individual demands HIV testing—or
not testing—by considering the benefits and costs of the
test. Potential compensation for HIV testing (WTA) may
alter the demand for testing, and private benefits and costs
are captured through several covariates in the survey.
The value of information is a function of an individual’s
probability of being infected with HIV: a higher probability
of infection corresponds to a greater likelihood that the
test results in access to effective, life-prolonging
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medications. The risk of HIV infection is captured in our
data by the participant’s age in years (a), the number of
lifetime sexual partners (s: 1–2, 3–4, or 5+), the presence
of HIV-related symptoms (h: any fever, cough, coughing
up blood, sweating at night, diarrhea, genital ulcers, or
rash) in the past 3 months, and reports of commercial sex
(c), defined as having ever given or received gifts or money
for sex.
The value of information also depends on the perceived accuracy of the HIV test (pa), which was assessed
by the question: “In your opinion, how accurate are HIV
tests?”, with answer options: “inaccurate”, “mostly accurate”, and “completely accurate”. An indicator variable for
“completely accurate” was included in the final model.
Preferences for testing and the value of information may
depend on experience with HIV testing, therefore an indicator variable for those who previously tested for HIV
(pt) was also included as a covariate.
HIV testing is freely available in diverse settings in the
study area; therefore the cost of testing primarily consists of the opportunity cost of time. To approximate opportunity cost and time preferences, we included
participants’ education (e: any secondary education vs.
primary education or less) as a covariate. Education may
also be considered a marker of health literacy [51]. The
occupation-based selection of the two high-risk groups
precluded the use of an occupation- or employmentbased measure of opportunity cost.
Marital status (m) and a sexual partner’s testing history
(st) may affect both the benefits and costs of testing and
were included as indicators of both risk and barriers.
Married individuals may be less likely to have multiple
concurrent sexual partners (i.e., lower risk); they may be
more concerned about the implications of a positive test
result (i.e., greater barriers); and they may feel greater
responsibility to others (i.e., greater benefit). A partner
having tested for HIV may reduce barriers to testing,
particularly for females, but may also change an individual’s perception of risk, as some consider their spouse’s
HIV test a proxy test [52].
Combining these factors, the demand for testing is a
function of the “price” of testing (q), the price of all
other goods (p), a resource endowment (y), and random
factors (ε) representing unmeasured preferences or
measurement error. The individual utility function is
expressed as V(p, q, y, ε). The price of testing is a function of the characteristics discussed above, q = f(a, e, h, s,
c, pt, m, st, pa). A priori, the demand for testing, q0, represents a utility-maximizing choice weighing the consumption of testing (a function of perceived benefits and
costs of testing) against the consumption of other goods.
On our survey, the WTA questions alter the hypothetical utility function, and demand for testing may change
from q0 to q1. Testing will decrease private utility for all

Page 4 of 11

who did not previously seek it, or V(p, q1, y, ε) < V(p, q0,
y, ε), unless offset through compensation, WTA, which
enables the purchase of other goods:




V p; q0 ; y; ε ¼V p; q1 ; yþW T A; ε
The prices of other goods (p) are constant in both
scenarios and cancel out of the econometric model, so
they are not included in the model or available on our
survey. Income (y) is also not available, although it is
captured indirectly through education.
For cultural [53, 54] and epidemiological [55, 56] reasons, HIV risk and willingness to accept an HIV test were
expected to differ by gender; therefore gender-specific
models were estimated. Among females and among men,
generalized Hausman tests [57] indicated that parameter
estimates did not differ significantly between randomly
selected community members and the respective high-risk
population (female barworkers: chi-square (10df) =9.41; p
= 0.4935; male mountain porters: chi-square (10df) =5.02;
p = 0.8895), thus the community sample and high-risk
groups were pooled within each gender.
Estimation

Because amounts were fixed across respondents, the
probabilities of observing the four possible response patterns to the two questions are described as follows:
π y;y ¼
π y;n ¼
π n;y ¼
π n;n ¼

Prð min W T A ≤ TSH 2000Þ
PrðTSH 2000 < min W TA ≤ TSH 5000Þ
PrðTSH 5000 < min W TA ≤ TSH 10000Þ
Prð min W TA > TSH 10000Þ

Or more generally, let these probabilities be indicated
by πc1, c2, where ct is the choice (y = yes, n = no) to bid t
(1 = first, 2 = second). To estimate WTA, we assume a
normally distributed error term that is uncorrelated
across individuals. The distribution of observed responses is given by the following function:
N h
X
i¼l

 

 
 

−2000
−5000
−2000
0 β
0 β
0 β
y;y
y;n
di ln Φ zi −
þ di ln Φ zi −
−Φ zi −
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
 
 


−10000
5000
0 β
0 β
n;y
þd i ln Φ zi −
−Φ zi −
þ dn;n
i ln 1
σ
σ
σ
σ


−10000
0 β
−Φ zi −
Þ
σ
σ

where the individuals’ binary choices are represented by
the mutually exclusive indicator variables dy,y, dy,n, dn,y,
dn,n as in [58]. Parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood with the Stata doubleb routine [58] for
double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation models [59]. Because study questions here elicited
willingness-to-accept rather than willingness-to-pay, the
estimated coefficients were multiplied with −1. Models
were estimated in Stata v.13.1.
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Ethics statement

Study activities were approved by the Institutional Review
Boards of Duke University and Kilimanjaro Christian
Medical University College, and Tanzania’s National Institute for Medical Research. Participants provided written
informed consent and received an incentive of 3,000
Tanzania Shilling (TSH) for participation in the study.

Results
Sample characteristics

Sample characteristics, by gender and risk group, are
shown in Table 1. On average, participants were just under
30 years old, with one-third of women and half of men
reporting any secondary education. Half of women and
40 % of men reported symptoms of HIV in the past
3 months. High risk of HIV infection is indicated by
one-quarter of women and one-half of men reporting 5
or more lifetime sexual partners; commercial sex was
reported by 61 % of female participants and 73 % of
male participants. Ninety percent of women and twothirds of men had previously tested for HIV, with half
of respondents reporting that their partner had tested.
Approximately one-third of participants perceived HIV
tests to be less than “completely accurate.”

There were significant differences in participant characteristics by gender, and between randomly selected
community members and high-risk groups (Table 1).
Compared with females, males reported higher education (p<0.001), fewer potential HIV-related symptoms
(p<0.01), and more lifetime sexual partners (p<0.001);
they were less likely to have previously tested for HIV
(p<0.001) and less likely to be married (p<0.001).
Compared with randomly selected female community
members, female barworkers were younger (p=0.005),
reported more HIV-related symptoms (p<0.001), more
lifetime sexual partners (p<0.001), higher rates of commercial sex (p<0.001), and were less likely to be married
(p<0.001) or have a partner who tested for HIV
(p=0.003). Porters were older (p<0.001) and less educated (p<0.001), reported more lifetime sexual partners
(p<0.001) and higher rates of commercial sex (p=0.001),
and were less likely to be married (p<0.001), compared
with randomly selected male community members.
Willingness to accept an HIV test

The distribution of responses to the WTA questions is
shown in Fig. 1. Of 721 participants, 196 (27 %) stated
that they would be willing to test for TSH 2,000 (or less),

Table 1 Basic demographic and risk characteristics of participants (N=721)
Females

Males

Community

Barworkers

Community

Variable

Value

Mean (sd) or N (%)

Mean (sd) or %

Mean (sd) or %

Mean (sd) or %

Age

Years

29.8

(7.7)

27.7

(5.4)

26.6

(7.5)

29.5

(6.9)

b

Education

Primary education or less

193

(67.2 %)

86

(63.7 %)

43

(37.4 %)

105

(57.1 %)

b

Secondary education

94

(32.8 %)

49

(36.3 %)

72

(62.6 %)

79

(42.9 %)

72

(62.6 %)

108

(58.7 %)

43

(37.4 %)

76

(41.3 %)

49

(42.6 %)

24

(13.0 %)

39

(33.9 %)

49

(26.6 %)

27

(23.5 %)

111

(60.3 %)

60

(52.2 %)

22

(12.0 %)

Symptoms of HIV, past 3 months

# of lifetime sexual partners

Commercial sex

No symptoms

155

(54.0 %)

48

(35.6 %)

Any symptoms

132

(46.0 %)

87

(64.4 %)

1-2

189

(65.9 %)

8

(5.9 %)

3-4

80

(27.9 %)

32

(23.7 %)

5+

18

(6.3 %)

95

(70.4 %)

Never

155

(54.0 %)

9

(6.7 %)

a

b

b

b

Porters

Ever

132

(46.0 %)

126

(93.3 %)

55

(47.8 %)

162

(88.0 %)

Previously tested for HIV

Never

24

(8.4 %)

17

(12.6 %)

39

(33.9 %)

56

(30.4 %)

At least once

263

(91.6 %)

118

(87.4 %)

76

(66.1 %)

128

(69.6 %)

Marital status

Not married

94

(32.8 %)

95

(70.4 %)

82

(71.3 %)

92

(50.0 %)

33

(28.7 %)

92

(50.0 %)

51

(44.3 %)

91

(49.5 %)

Partner has tested for HIV

Perceived accuracy of the HIV test

Married

193

(67.2 %)

40

(29.6 %)

Partner has not tested

119

(41.5 %)

77

(57.0 %)

Partner has tested

168

(58.5 %)

58

(43.0 %)

64

(55.7 %)

93

(50.5 %)

Mostly accurate or inaccurate

81

(28.2 %)

40

(29.6 %)

42

(36.5 %)

55

(29.9 %)

206

(71.8 %)

95

(70.4 %)

73

(63.5 %)

129

(70.1 %)

Completely accurate
N

b

287

135

a

115

b

b

b

184

The significance of differences between high-risk populations and the respective general community samples was assessed using Student’s t-test, chi-squared test,
or Fisher’s exact test, as appropriate
a
, and b indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively
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27.2

10
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7.1
2.5

0.8

0

2.4
2,000 or less

2,001-5,000

5,001-10,000

10,001-20,000 20,001-30,000 30,001-50,000

>50,000

Fig. 1 Distribution of WTA responses (2012/13 Tanzania Shillings; N=721). 6 of 98 respondents (0.8 % of the total sample) did not provide a
numeric answer to the follow-up question of how much they would have to be offered to test for HIV tomorrow. Their binary choices (No; No)
are included in the WTA analyses. At the time of the study 1 US Dollar was worth approximately 1,550 TSH. The cutoff values of 2,000 TSH, 5,000
TSH and 10,000 TSH correspond to approximately $1.30, $3.20, and $6.40, respectively

whereas 98 (13.6 %) said that they would require more
than TSH 10,000. The latter group, in an open-ended
follow-up question, was asked about the amount at
which they would test; the highest amount was TSH
150,000 (~$100). More than half of participants (419 of
721 participants; 58.1 %) indicated that they would test
for HIV if offered TSH 5,000; the number increased to
623 (86.4 %) in response to an offer of TSH 10,000.
The average WTA estimate was TSH 4,564 (US$ 2.94;
95 % Confidence Interval; CI: TSH 4201 to 4927; Fig. 2).
Randomly selected male community members had the
highest WTA values (US$ 3.54; TSH 5,484; 95 % CI: TSH
4,351 to 6,618), whereas female community members had
the lowest values (US$ 2.34; TSH 3,622; 95 % CI: TSH
2,956 to 4,287).
The estimated WTA for an HIV test varied significantly by the expected benefit and cost measures
included in our model, namely respondents’ risk characteristics and opportunity cost (Table 2). Among females,
secondary education (p<0.01) and a previous HIV test
(p<0.05) were associated with higher WTA values,
whereas females who reported to have engaged in commercial sex and those whose partner had tested for HIV
indicated lower WTA values (both p<0.05). Among
males, HIV-related symptoms in the past 3 months were

associated with a lower WTA (p<0.01). For both genders, the most significant association was observed with
respondents’ perception of the accuracy of the HIV test,
with those who believed that HIV tests are completely
accurate indicating that they would test for approximately one third less (p<0.01).

Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to use stated
preference surveys to probe the range of economic
incentives required for a pay-for-testing strategy in lowresource settings. Our study included both representative community samples and high-risk populations from
each gender. We demonstrate that (1) relatively modest
economic incentives are potentially useful in increasing
HIV testing rates in this population, and (2) willingness
to accept differs significantly by gender, with indicators
of HIV risk, and with participants’ perceptions of the accuracy of the HIV test.
The results have important policy implications. First,
financial incentives for HIV testing may be highly cost
effective. HIV prevalence estimates of 3.8 % [60] and
Census data [35] suggest that, of the 94,530 Moshi residents aged 18–49, approximately 3,600 live with HIV.
Assuming, optimistically, that half of infected adults are
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Fig. 2 Mean WTA estimates from univariate double-bounded choice models, by gender and HIV risk group (2012/13; Tanzania Shillings)

already aware of their HIV infection [61], universal testing could plausibly identify 1,800 undiagnosed HIV cases
in Moshi alone. Further, if national incidence estimates
(0.32 % [62]) were rescaled to account for lower-thanaverage HIV prevalence in the study area (national HIV
prevalence is estimated at 5.1 % [60]), universal annual
repeat testing would be expected to identify about 200
new HIV infections each year. The mean WTA estimates identified in this study suggest that in this population universal testing could potentially be achieved
with incentive costs of about $280,000, amounting to
$150 per diagnosis of prevalent HIV infection, and
$1400 per diagnosis of annual incident infections. With
an estimated 2.25 discounted quality-adjusted life years
(QALY) gained for each newly infected person identified [63], the incentive costs per QALY range from
under $70 for prevalent HIV infections to $620 for

incident infections. Additional QALYs would be gained
from reduced numbers of secondary infections [63].
These estimates compare favorably to Tanzania’s 2012
per capita GDP of $835 [64] and to prior estimates of
the cost effectiveness of regular HIV re-testing among
high prevalence populations in low-resource settings
[63].
Second, while many diverse characteristics influence
an individual’s cost structure and thus their individual
WTA, systematic variation in WTA by gender, risk and
other characteristics plausibly reflects systematic variation in individuals’ valuations of benefits and barriers,
and can thus inform the design of HIV testing interventions that target specific risk groups or specific barriers
to testing. Larger WTA estimates, analogous to higher
incentive amounts required to entice individuals to test,
were observed for females who had completed secondary

Table 2 Marginal WTA estimates from gender-specific multivariate double-bounded choice models (2012/13 Tanzania Shillings)
Females (N=422)

Males (N=299)

Coefficient

Std.err.

p-value

Coefficient

Std.err.

p-value

Age

−4.6

(34.1)

0.893

16.1

(55.5)

0.771

Any secondary education

1398.9 b

(499.2)

0.005

1149.1

(618.9)

0.063

Any HIV symptoms

−722.0

(466.2)

0.122

−1654.9

3-4 lifetime sexual partners

−208.0

(605.5)

0.731

1411.4

b

(570.9)

0.004

(791.9)

0.075

5+ lifetime sexual partners

593.5

(664.4)

0.372

365.4

(809.1)

0.652

Ever exchanged sex for gifts or money

−1273.3 a

(564.2)

0.024

−172.2

(698.4)

0.805

Previously tested for HIV

1920.9 a

(851.4)

0.024

−583.3

(651.7)

0.371

Married

−413.0

(530.9)

0.437

256.1

(853.3)

0.764

Partner tested

−987.7

(501.4)

0.049

216.7

(703.6)

0.758

Test is perceived to be completely accurate

−1445.3 b

(508.5)

0.005

−1820.3 b

(588.9)

0.002

a

and

b

a

indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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education. This observation is consistent with different
time preferences as well as greater income potential and
thus higher opportunity cost for secondary school graduates. An offer of HIV testing that provides expanded
testing hours, reduced waiting time, or allows for
appointments for testing, may appeal to those with the
greatest opportunity cost.
Among females, a prior HIV test was also associated
with higher incentive amounts. This observation is consistent with lower expected benefits from a second HIV
test, as the likelihood of incident HIV infection since the
last test is generally lower than the cumulative, lifetime
risk of infection at the first test. A similar effect among
males was not statistically significant at conventional
levels, plausibly due to the smaller sample size. Policy
messages aimed at increasing rates of repeat testing may
be more effective if recommended repeat testing intervals take into consideration variation in individuals’
ongoing risk of HIV infection [63].
Indicators of HIV risk were associated with lower
WTA estimates, an observation consistent with greater
expected benefits from an HIV test. Females who had
ever engaged in commercial sex required a smaller
incentive amount than those who had not. The most
plausible reason for this is that commercial sex workers
are aware of their increased risk of HIV infection and
perceive greater utility of testing. Alternatively, it is possible that commercial sex workers are more open to
accepting incentives in exchange for certain behaviors
(i.e. sex and HIV testing). Similarly, among males, lower
required incentive amounts were observed among those
with recent symptoms potentially related to HIV. Others
have described high rates of late, (i.e. symptomatic)
presentation of HIV disease among males seeking HIV
testing [65]. Efforts should be expanded to incentivize
males to test for HIV prior to the onset of symptoms.
Finally, the strong association of WTA with participants’ perception of test accuracy points to the potential
value of information campaigns to correct misperceptions about the accuracy of HIV testing [66]. Perceived
unreliability of test results and distrust of HIV testing
technologies has been previously shown to discourage
uptake of HIV testing [67–69]; our finding is consistent
with an increased incentive amount required to encourage those to test who are less confident in the accuracy
of the test results.
As the parameters for incentivized HIV testing are
explored, we acknowledge several important ethical considerations that derive from conditional cash transfers for
health interventions. These have been explored in more
detail by others [17, 70–74]. From a policy perspective,
some argue that in highly resource-constrained settings
limited health care funds should be allocated to overcome
supply-side obstacles, such as expanding health system
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capacity, before investing in cash incentives [75]. Others
point to the potential for unintended consequences of
cash transfer programs. Stecklov et al., for example, described an increase in fertility rates in a Honduran program that provided cash transfers targeting health,
nutritional, and educational outcomes for children [76];
and evidence from Malawi suggests that financial incentives may have the perverse effect of increasing HIV risk
behaviors as a result of additional disposable income [77].
The equitability of cash-incentivized health-interventions
across economic strata and by gender is another potential
concern. Moreover, establishing financial incentives for
certain health behaviors, such as HIV testing, could set expectations that other health behaviors (e.g. attending antenatal clinic visits) should also be incentivized, which might
indirectly result in decreased participation. Finally, concerns about the real-world implementation and long-term
sustainability of incentives must be considered: There is
evidence that extrinsic motivators, such as financial incentives, may crowd out intrinsic motivators [78], potentially
reducing testing rates after incentives are no longer provided. These ethical considerations at the population
level merit careful deliberation. On the individual level,
the greatest ethical concern is the potential for coercion – namely undermining the recipient’s autonomy
and the integrity of her/his own decision making
process, with undue inducement [74]. If an individual
is already predisposed to test for HIV and the incentive
represents a gentle ‘nudge’ from inaction to action
along a pathway in keeping with his/her considered
values, we see no concerns. On the other hand, if the financial reward is so great relative to potential risks (e.g.
potential spousal abuse for testing), then the incentive
may constitute wrongful interference and undue coercion. Extensive formative research, careful piloting and
ongoing modifications of cash incentives are necessary
to guard against perverse incentives, unintended consequences, and the potential for coercion.
Limitations

This study is subject to several limitations. First, starting bids were not randomized due to the survey’s
administration as a paper survey. Different WTA estimates may have been obtained if starting values had
been randomized [79, 80] or if the incentive structure
had involved either losses or lotteries [81]. Second, the
contingent valuation questions were part of a broader
study, and we did not power the data collection specifically for the analyses described in this paper. Small
sample sizes, particularly for males in the community
sample, may have contributed to the lack of statistical
significance of parameters describing opportunity cost
(any secondary education) among males, and risk
(number of sexual partners) in both genders. Third, the
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hypothetical nature of stated preference contingent
valuation data may not reflect ‘real-world’ behaviors:
WTA estimates based on stated preferences may differ
from estimates that would be obtained on the basis of
revealed preferences data [82, 83], and barriers specific
to HIV, such as fear and stigma, may limit the acceptability of financial incentives in the context of HIV testing [6].
Fourth, further research is needed to evaluate the extent
to which specific WTA estimates are transferable to other
risk groups within and beyond the study area.

Conclusion
This study used stated preference survey methods to
probe the value of economic incentives required for a payfor-testing strategy in a low-resource setting. The results
support the value of information campaigns to correct
misperceptions about the accuracy of HIV testing, and
that relatively modest amounts of money may be sufficient
to incentivize at-risk populations to test for HIV. For
translation of the results to policy, additional implementation research will be required.
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